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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

For the reasons set forth hereinafter, Intervenor
GARFIELD COUNTY respectfully submits that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to decide this case.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioner NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION
filed an original "Petition for Review" in this Court, challenging an exchange of real property between Garfield County and
respondent THE STATE OF UTAH.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Whether the exchange of real property between Garfield
County and the State of Utah was proper, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 65-1-70.

GOVERNING STATUTE

Former Utah Code Annotated Section 65-1-70, in effect
at all times material to this case, provided as follows, in
pert inent part:

In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land
holdings of the State, the Division of State Lands is
hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held by
the State for other land of equal value within the

State held by other proprietors; and upon request of
the division, the governor is hereby authorized to
execute and deliver the necessary patents to such other
proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the
lands so exchanged; provided, that no exchange shall
be made by the Division until a patent for the land so
received in exchange shall have been issued to such
proprietors of [or] their grantors.
A copy of former Section 65-1-70 is included in the
Addendum to this Brief.
The 1988 State Legislature repealed Title 65 and
enacted Title 65A, effective July 1, 1988.

A comparable provi-

sion is now found at Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-7-7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an original proceeding in this Court, brought
by petitioner National Parks and Conservation Association (hereafter referred to as "NPCA"), under a "Petition for Review",
challenging an exchange of real property between intervenor
Garfield County (hereafter referred to as "Garfield County"), and
respondents Board of State Lands and Patrick D. Spurgin, as
Director, Division of State Lands and Forestry, State of Utah
(hereafter referred to as "The State of Utah"),

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In April, 1987, Garfield County applied to the State of
Utah to exchange certain real property owned by Garfield County
near the Bryce Canyon Airport for a State school section located
-2-

within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park, through
which the Boulder-to-Bullfrog County road, commonly referred to
as the "Burr Trail", passes.

(Administrative Record, hereafter

referred to as "R.", pp. 5-7.)

The State school section was

appraised at $65,000.00 (R., pp. 8-24.)

The County acreage near

the Bryce Canyon Airport was appraised at $66,000.00.

(R. pp.

31, 44. )
On September 11, 1987, the Board of State Lands and
Forestry approved the concept of the exchange, subject to further
evaluation of the Countyfs offer to ensure that the value of the
trust for the exchange would be better than equal value.
54.)

(R., p.

On October 16, 1987, the Division of State Lands and

Forestry conducted an analysis of the appraisals, and concluded
that they accurately reflected the value of the lands in question.

(R., pp. 59-60. )
On November 3, 1987, the Division of State Lands and

Forestry advised Garfield County that it would require from the
County property with an appraised value of 150 % of the appraised
value of the State school section, in order to complete the
exchange.

(R., pp. 72-73.)

Garfield County then submitted two

(2) County-owned lots in the Richfield City Industrial Park, with
an appraised value of $33,500.00, thereby making a total exchange
value of 151.5 % of the value of the State school section.

On

December 21, 1987, the Director of the Division of State Lands
and Forestry approved the exchange.

(R., p.89.)

On December 24, 1987, after the requisite deeds from
Garfield County had been executed, a Patent to the State school
-3-

section was executed by the Governor of the State of Utah and
officially filed in the Office of the Lieutenant Governor of the
State of Utah.

On December 29, 1987, the Patent was recorded in

the Office of the County Recorder of Garfield County.

A certi-

fied copy of the recorded Patent is included in the Addendum to
this Brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (3) (e) provides

that this Court has "appellate jurisdiction" over "final orders
and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings, originating
with... the Board of State Lands."

(Emphasis added.)

Under

Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1986), it
is unclear whether Section 78-2-2 (3) (e) is actually intended to
refer to the Board or the Division of State Lands.

Regardless of

that interpretation, however, because this case involves simply
an exchange of real property between Garfield County and the
State of Utah, as specifically authorized by Utah Code Annotated
Section 65-1-70, there is no "final order or decree" from a
formal adjudicative proceeding in either the Board or the Division of State Lands for this Court to review in this case under
its appellate jurisdiction.

Furthermore, there is no statutory

authorization for original, direct review in this Court of such
an exchange.

Therefore, this Court lacks both original and

appellate jurisdiction in this case.
2.

This case is not ripe for adjudication, because
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NPCA is not an aggrieved party, there has been no adverse impact
on the subject real property, and there exists no justiciable
controversy for this Court to decide. Baird v. State, 574 P. 2d
713 (Utah 1978).
Furthermore, NPCA lacks standing in this case.

It has

suffered no distinct and palpable injury whatsoever which could
give it a personal stake in the outcome of the subject exchange.
NPCA does not have greater interest in the exchange than does
Garfield County, as the owner in fee simple absolute of the
subject real property.

This case does not present unique issues

of great public importance.
before this Court.

Consequently, NPCA has no standing

Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716

P. 2d 796 (Utah 1986).
3.

The issue in this case is simply whether or not the

State of Utah either acted outside of its authority, or in a
manner so clearly outside reason that its action must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary.

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of

Salt Lake County, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 1976).

On the

administrative record before this Court, and in view of the
express statutory authorization of Utah Code Annotated Section
65-1-70, it is clear that the exchange is valid under Utah Law.
4.

A Patent to land is the highest form of title, and

is immune from collateral attack. Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11
P. 571 (1886); appeal dismissed in Street v. Ferry, 119 U.S. 385
(1886).

NPCA has no legal basis which could possibly give rise

to a cause of action for it to seek rescission of the Patent in
this case.

Consequently, the validity of the Patent to Garfield
-5-

County in this case should be upheld by this Court.
5.

Petitioner's brief relies, in large measure, upon

materials which have been excluded by this Court in its denial of
NPCA's

Motion to Supplement Administrative Record.

Therefore,

those portions of the brief, and those issues which relate to
matters which are not included in or supported by the administrative record which is before the Court in this case, should be
disregarded by this Court.

Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406,

385 P. 2d 154 ( 1963).

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.

On page 24 of its brief, petitioner simply declares
that "NPCA is confident that this Court has jurisdiction over
this action", and then attempts to justify that assertion with an
Affidavit by Professor Boyce, which has been excluded from the
record by this Court in its denial of petitioner^ Motion to
Supplement Administrative Record.

For the following reasons,

this Court lacks jurisdiction in this case:
It is evident that petitioner has misconstrued the
governing statutes in this case.

First, NPCA ignores the

distinction between the Board of State Lands and the Division of
State Lands, as clearly differentiated by this Court in Adkins v.
Division of State Lands, 719 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1986).

The Board of

State Lands is vested with policy-making functions, as provided
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by Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-1-2;

while the Division of

State Lands is the executive authority for the management of
State lands, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-1-4.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2 (3) (e), relied upon
by petitioner, provides that this Court has appellate jurisdiction over "final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings, originating with ... the Board of State Lands."
(Emphasis added.)

It is unclear, under Adkins, if that provision

actually refers to the Board of State Lands, or the Division of
State Lands.

Regardless of the interpretation thereof, however,

it is clear that there is no appellate jurisdiction for the Court
to assert in this case, because there was no "final order or
decree" in a "formal adjudicative proceeding" which originated in
either the Board of State Lands, or the Division of State Lands,
in this case.
In Peatross vs. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, 555 P. 2d 281 (Utah 1976) at 284, this Court defined
"appellate jurisdiction" as follows:
The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the
authority to review the actions or judgments of an
inferior tribunal upon the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or
judgment. Correlated to this is the principle that
ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting within the
scope of its authority, has conducted a hearing and
arrived at a decision, the reviewing court will examine
only the certified record; and will not interfere with
matters of discretion or upset the actions of the lower
tribunal except upon a showing that the tribunal acted
in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly
outside reason that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. (Emphasis added.) 555 P. 2d at
284.
In this case, there was neither a hearing held, nor a
decision made.

Instead, there was simply an exchange of real

property between the State of Utah and Garfield County, as
specifically authorized by former Utah Code Annotated Section
65-1-70.

Such action does not constitute any sort of formal

adjudication which would rise to the level of a "final order or
decree" in a case originating in the "Board" of State Lands, as
required by Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2

(3) (e).

Furthermore, as specifically interpreted by this Court
in Adkins, supra, the former law, set forth in former Utah Code
Annotated Section 65-1-9, only provided for judicial review of
"orders" of the "board", in the district court.

There was no

provision for original, direct review in this Court.

As of

January 1, 1988, agency action is now governed by the new Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (Chapter 46b, Title 63).

Neither

of those statutes applies in this case.
Simply stated, therefore, this Court lacks both original and appellate jurisdiction over this case.

Because there is

neither appellate nor original jurisdiction in this Court, nor is
there a "final order or decree" for this Court to review, the
"Petition for Review" should be dismissed, with prejudice.

POINT II:

PETITIONER LACKS STANDING IN THIS CASE.
There exists a serious question as to the

justiciability of the "Petition for Review" in this case, and as
to whether or not the issues raised therein are ripe for judicial
determination.

As this Court observed in Redwood Gym v. Salt

Lake County Commission, 624 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1981) at 1148, "In
order to constitute a justiciable controversy, a conflict over
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the application of a legal provision must have sharpened into an
actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between
the parties thereto.

Where there exists no more than a differ-

ence of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a piece
of legislation to a situation in which the parties might, at some
future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for adjudication."

(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the "Petition for Review" appears to be

premised upon the notion that, by exchanging the subject real
property with Garfield County, the State of Utah has somehow
caused a "distinct and palpable injury" to petitioner.

Implicit

within that notion is NPCA's unfounded assumption that Garfield
County will be somehow less capable of managing that property,
and, therefore, that some automatic adverse impact upon petitioner's abstract "recreational and aesthetic interests" may result
at some future point in time.

NPCA fails to recognize that, at

the present time, the subject real property is in precisely the
same condition as it was under the ownership of the State of
Utah, prior to the exchange.

No change whatsoever has been made

by Garfield County to the land.

For NPCA to assert that it has

been "damaged", when all that has happened is that title to the
land has been transferred from the State of Utah to Garfield
County, is to engage in unwarranted speculation without any basis
whatsoever in fact.

There has been no act undertaken on the

property which could possibly have any adverse impact upon any
interest claimed to be promoted by petitioner.

Consequently, the

question is not ripe for adjudication by this Court, and there
-9-

exists no justiciable controversy in this case.

Baird v. State,

574 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1978).
The present test for standing under Utah law is as
follows:
The Utah Supreme Court has established three tests to
determine whether a litigant has standing.
... First,
the litigant can show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal
stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Seicond, the
litigant may have standing if no one else has a greater
interest in the outcome of the case and the issues are
unlikely to be raised otherwise. Even if he is unable
to meet the first two tests, under the third test, a
litigant may nonetheless have standing if the issues
are unique and of such great public importanc€> that
they ought to be decided in the furtherance of the
public interest. ... Blodgett v. Zions First National
Bank, 752 P. 2d 901, 80 U.A.R. 5, 7 (Utah App. 1988).
NPCA attempts to satisfy the "distinct and palpable
injury" requirement under theories advanced in cases brought
under federal environmental laws, by claiming that those cases
demonstrate the type of injury sufficient to satisfy the standing
requirements of Utah law. However, in addition to providing a basis
for standing under the federal Administrative Procedures Act, the
federal statutes also contain specific provisions which entitle
interested parties to bring actions for enforcement thereunder.
Furthermore, the federal courts have found a broad-based range of
so-called "prudential" standing interests in environmental cases.
This Court, however, has not adopted the same standards
used by the federal courts for standing in federal environmental
cases.

In Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d 1145 (Utah 1983) at

1148-49, this Court held that "It is generally insufficient for a
plaintiff to assert only a general interest he shares in common
with members of the public at large.

... We will not entertain

generalized grievances that are more appropriately directed to
the legislative and executive branches of

government."

Accord,

Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P. 2d 1166
(Utah 1987) at 1170.
In Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P. 2d 796
(Utah 1986), this Court thoroughly reviewed the doctrine of
standing under Utah law, and concluded that Terracor did not have
standing to challenge certain procedures used by the Board of
State Lands in leasing a parcel of real property to its competitor.

In Society of Professional Journalists, supra, this Court

explained its reasoning in the Terracor decision, as follows:
The only Utah writ case to come to our attention in
which a petitioner has been denied standing to challenge the action of a body before which the petitioner
had earlier appeared and pressed a claim is Terracor v.
Utah State Board of Lands and Forestry. 716 P. 2d 796
(Utah 1986). There, the finding that the petitioner
lacked standing was based on this Court's conclusion
that in its petition for a writ, Terracor specifically
did not seek to overturn the decision of the Land Board
that was adverse to it, but was only attacking the
lawfulness of the action of the Board in favor of
another party. Id. at 798-800. This Court reasoned
that a resolution of the issues presented would have no
impact on the decision of the Land Board which was
adverse to Terracor.
Phrased in terms appropriate to the instant
matter, the Terracor petition for a writ was viewed as
not being appellate in nature; Terracor was simply
mounting a fresh challenge to the agency's actions.
Therefore, its standing before this Court was in no way
advanced by the fact that it had standing before the
Board of State Lands in an unrelated proceeding below.
From that perspective, this Court saw Terracor's writ
petition as nothing but a generalized attack on the
Board's mode of proceeding, an attack that could have
been made equally well by anyone. Therefore, Terracor
couldTHow no adverse interest and was denied standing.
TcH Had Terracor directly challenged the agency's
decision adverse to it, there would have been no
question as to its standing to seek the writ. See id.
(Emphasis added.) 743 P. 2d at 1172, footnote 7.
In this case, NPCA is even further removed from the
_i i_

position in which Terracor sought, and was denied, standing
before this Court.

As set forth in the letter dated November 16,

1987, from Patrick D. Spurgin, Director of the Division of State
Lands and Forestry, to counsel for petitioner (R., p. 75), the
Division of State Lands and Forestry has no procedures under
which a request for intervention by NPCA in the consideration of
an exchange proposal might be granted, because consideration of
an exchange application by the Division is not viewed as an
adjudicative action under present law.

Therefore, NPCA had no

basis whatsoever for standing in the process of the exchange
between the State of Utah and Garfield County, particularly where
that process was expressly sanctioned by Utah Code Annotated
Section 65-1-70.
This case is similar in nature to that considered in
York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials,

714

P. 2d 679 (Utah 1986), in which this Court found that the plaintiff had failed to show that he had any personal stake in the
controversy he raised, or that he was adversely affected by the
governmental action.

A mere allegation of an adverse impact,

without more, is insufficient.

Plaintiff may not allege jeopardy

or injury to others in order to confer standing upon his own
claims.

714 P. 2d at 680;

Jenkins v. Swan, supra, 675 P. 2d at

1150-51.
In short, in this case, the "Petition for Review" seeks
to challenge the actions of the State of Utah in making an
exchange of real property with Garfield County.

NPCA has no

personal stake in the outcome of that transaction.
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No injury

whatsoever has occurred to petitioner.

NPCA certainly does not

have greater interest in the outcome of the case than does
Garfield County, as the owner of the subject property.

This case

presents no "unique" issue of "great public importance", despite
NPCA f s characterizations, but, instead, is simply a generalized
attack on the mode of proceeding which could have been made
equally well by anyone else.

Because there is no adverse impact,

petitioner is not an aggrieved party, and has no standing before
this Court, under any test of standing set forth in Utah law.
NPCA merely seeks to convert this Court into a forum for the
resolution of a political and ideological dispute over the
performance of government in the exercise of its statutory
functions.

The "Petition for Review" should be dismissed, with

prejudice.

POINT III:

THE EXCHANGE IS VALID UNDER UTAH LAW.

Despite the protracted effort by NPCA in its brief to
incorporate various theories under federal environmental laws
into its attack upon the exchange at issue in this case, the fact
remains that this exchange is valid under Utah law, as expressly
authorized by former Utah Code Annotated Section 65-1-70.

This

case is not about federal "public trust" lands, nor is it about
the litigation over the Burr Trail, which has already been
adjudicated in the federal courts.

This case deals with a State

school section, and is governed by state law.

The National Park

Organic Act does not apply to a State school section;
-13-

rather,

state lands are governed by "multiple use, sustained yield"
principles, under former Utah Code Annotated Section 65-1-14, now
codified at Utah Code Annotated Section 65A-2-1.
NPCA's claims in this case bear a remarkable
resemblance to those made in Save Our Dunes v. Alabama Dept. of
Environmental Management, 834 F. 2d 984 (11th Cir. 1987).

In

that case, various environmental organizations challenged
approval given by the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management to developers who wished to erect structures in a
coastal zone.

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit held that the environmental organizations had to
be "aggrieved" parties under state law, in order to challenge the
agency action, which did not hinge on their standing status in
federal court.

The Court narrowly defined "aggrieved" persons as

only those who own land affected by the issuance of a building
permit, and denied plaintiff's claims, as follows:
As Alabama land use cases suggest, aesthetic,
environmental, or recreational concerns alone do not
confer "aggrieved party" status; the complainantlriust
show that an adverse agency action somehow affected his
or her interest in land.
Tn the present ca¥e plaintiffs consist of various
civic-minded and environmental organizations, whose
members may or may not be citizens of Alabama.
Plaintiffs claim that they use and enjoy Alabama's
coastal beaches. Yet they have not shown how ADEM's
actions adversely affected their legal or equitable
interests in land. Consequently, plaintiffs have not
established that they are "aggrieved" within the
meaning of state law. Under the fourteeth amendment,
plaintiff's1 claim to a constitutionally cognizable
"property" interest must be grounded in state law.
Thus, without demonstrating" how they qualify as
"aggrieved" persons under Alabama law, plaintiffs have
no property interest in a state appeal tc> support their
claim to due process. 834 F. 2d at 988-89. (Emphasis
added.)
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In this case, NPCA has no property interest whatsoever
in the land which is the subject of this exchange.

That property

is now owned by Garfield County, in fee simple absolute.
Petitioner's abstract "aesthetic and recreational" concerns are
not sufficient to confer upon NPCA the status of an "aggrieved"
party in this case, under Utah law, such that it has any
legitimate basis to challenge the exchange between the State of
Utah and Garfield County.
In short, the only issue properly before the Court in
this case, as set forth in Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake County, cited above, is simply whether or not the State
of Utah either acted outside of its authority, or in a manner so
clearly outside reason that its action must be deemed capricious
and arbitrary.

555 P. 2d at 284.

Under that narrow standard of

review, on the administrative record before this Court, and in
view of the specific statutory authorization of Section 65-1-70,
it is clear that, in approving the subject exchange, the State of
Utah acted in proper compliance with its trust responsibilities,
and by its express statutory authority.

Therefore, the "Petition

for Review" is not well taken, and should be dismissed, with
prejudice.
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POINT IV: THE VALIDITY OF THE PATENT TO GARFIELD COUNTY SHOULD BE
UPHELD.

As evidenced by the Patent issued by the State of Utah to
Garfield County, a copy of which is included in the Addendum to
this Brief, Garfield County is now the owner, in fee simple
absolute, of the real property which is the subject of this
action.

Petitioner seeks to have that conveyance rescinded by

this Court in its "Petition for Review".
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared in Easterlinq
v. Ferris, 651 P. 2d 677 (Okla. 1982) at 682, "The cancellation
of a deed is an exertion of the most extraordinary power of a
court of equity.

The power ought not to be exercised except in a

clear and exceptional case."

Furthermore, this Court has held

that, in order to obtain a decree rescinding a written
conveyance, the facts necessary for the allowance of that remedy
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by a
mere preponderance.

Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 571

(1950) at 580.
More than a century ago, this Court was asked to decide
whether a land patent was improperly granted.

In Ferry v.

Street, 4 Utah 521, 7 P. 712 (1885), this Court specifically
held, "If, under any assumed state of circumstances a patent can
be valid, then it cannot be attacked in any collateral
proceeding, or in any manner, except by direct action to set
aside the deed indicated, either by the United States, or by the
persons who have succeeded to its right."
(Emphasis added.)

7 P. at 713.

On re-hearing, this Court carefully considered the
validity of the patent in Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 521, 11 P. 571
(1886), and held as follows:
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
establish the following propositions of law: First.
That the various acts of Congress mentioned reserving
portions of the public lands of the United States to
the territories or states for the benefit of their
people, vest the title of such lands so reserved in the
territories or states when the lands are surveyed, or
when they are bounded and ascertained. Until such time
the obligation is executory, and the title remains in
the federal government. Second. If the officers of
the land department had no authority to issue the
patent, for the reason that there was no law
authorizing the sale of the land, or that it had been
reserved for sale, (being identified,) or that the
title was not in the United States, the patent is void.
Third. As to all questions of fact which the land
department is called upon to consider and pass upon
before issuing the patent, the judgment of that department is unassailable, except in a direct proceeding for
its afvnulment. Fourth. Among the questions the land
department is called upon to consider is the character
of the land, and the class to which it belongs, whether
agricultural or mineral, and whether it is within a
town-site. Fifth. IjP the land department had jurisdiction, the law conclusively presumes, Tn a collateral
proceeding, the existence of: all circumstances essential to the validity of the~patent. Unless the patent
is void, in view of the law, or of circumstances which
the court may take judicial notice of, it must be held
valid. All other essential circumstances must be
presumed to have existed. 11 P. at 576. (Emphasis
added. )
The appeal of that case was dismissed by the United
States Supreme Court in Street v. Ferry,

119 U.S. 385 (1886).

This principle was applied to a patent of state lands
in Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953), in
which this Court held that "an attack on the patent, valid on its
face, ... is reserved unto the sovereign." 264 P. 2d at 854.
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(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, under Utah law, NPCA has no legal

basis for a collateral attack upon the Patent in this case.
The general rule that a patent to land is the highest
evidence of title, and is immune from collateral attack, prevails
throughout the Western states.
Ariz. App. 551, 441 P. 2d 586

See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 7
(Ariz. App. 1968);

Hill, 150 Colo. 563, 375 P. 2d 337 (Colo. 1962);

Ashley v.
Dredge Corp. v.

Husite Co., 78 Nev. 69, 369 P. 2d 676 (Nev. 1962); cert, denied,
371 U.S. 821 (1962);
1285 (N.M. 1978);

Bustamante v. Sena, 92 N.M. 72, 582 P. 2d

See generally, 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Lands,

Sections 74-76 (1984), pp. 572-574.
In addition to the fact that, under a century of
precedent by this Court, NPCA has no legal basis for a collateral
attack upon the validity of the Patent in this case, theire are
compelling policy reasons why the validity of the Patent should
be upheld in this case.

The State of Utah, as the holder of

deeds to the real property which was conveyed to the State by
Garfield County last year, has undoubtedly received the benefits
of and profits from the use of those lands, and may well have
already included those lands in management plans and contractual
arrangements with third parties, in reliance upon the subject
exchange.

There is no clear and convincing evidence before this

Court which would warrant the rescission of those conveyances,
and the violation of any contractual arrangements which may have
been made in reliance thereon. The "Petition for Review" should
be dismissed, with prejudice.
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POINT V:

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IMPROPERLY RELIES UPON MATTERS NOT

OF RECORD IN THIS CASE,

At the time it filed its opening brief in this case,
NPCA filed a Motion to Supplement Administrative Record with this
Court, in which it sought to introduce various affidavits, a
newspaper article, and other documents into this case.

Following

the submission of memoranda and oral argument, on July 19, 1988,
this Court denied the Motion to Supplement Administrative Record.
NPCA's opening brief, in large part, relies upon
materials with which it had sought to supplement the administrative record in this case, and which have been excluded by this
Court.

Therefore, those portions of the brief which rely upon

those materials, particularly in the Statement of Facts and
Jurisdiction portions thereof, should be disregarded by this
Court.
In Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154
(1963), this Court held that it could not consider facts stated
in the briefs which are absent in the official record, even if
true.

Accord, Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1986);

see, Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, cited above, in which
the Utah Court of Appeals held that "merely attaching a document
to an appellate brief does not make the document part of the
record."

752 P. 2d at 903-904, footnote 1.
This Court has repeatedly held that it would not

adjudicate issues which are not supported by the record.
e.g., Wood v. Myrup, 681 P. 2d 1255 (Utah 1984); Combe v.
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See,

Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P. 2d 733 (Utah 1984);
Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P. 2d 128 (Utah 1978).
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court
should disregard those portions of NPCA's opening brief which
rely upon materials which have been excluded by this Court; and
that this Court should decline to adjudicate those issues raised
in petitioner's brief which are not included in or supported by
the administrative record which is before the Court in this case.
See, Hobbs v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P. 2d 1128
(Utah 1984);

Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730

(Utah 1985).

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the "Petition for
Review" should be dismissed by this Court, with prejudice.
DATED this 31st day of October, 1988.

Patrick B. Nolan
Garfield County Attorney
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65-1-68

STATE LANDS

65-1-68. Subdivision of state lands into lots — Appraisal
and sale.
Any portion of the public lands of this state not occupied by bona fide
settlers having preference right of purchase, may be subdivided into lots, and
sold as provided in this chapter, the board first being satisfied that by a
subdivision of any tract into lots a sale of the same can be made for a greater
amount than if sold in legal subdivisions. The board may survey such tracts
and direct their subdivision. A plat of the survey shall be filed in the office of
the county recorder of the county wherein the land is situated, and a copy in
the office of the board. Tracts so subdivided shall not be subject to lease, but
each lot shall be sold at public auction at such times as the board may direct.
The manner of appraisement and sale of such subdivided lands shall be in all
respects the same as in the case of other lands sold.
History: L. 1899, ch. 64, § 36; C.L. 1907,
§ 2358; C.L. 1917, § 5610; L. 1921, ch. 118,
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
86-1-53.

Cross-References. — Appraisal and sale of
state lands, §§ 65-1-26 and 65-1-29.
County recorder, Chapter 21 of Title 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Mandamus.
The discretion vested in the board by this
section will not be interfered with by manda-

mus. Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 534
(1900), followed, Hamblin v. State Bd. of Land
Comm'rs, 55 Utah 402, 187 P. 178 (1919).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 178.
Key Numbers. — Public Lands <s=> 181.

65-1-69. Method of accounting by state auditor.
The state auditor shall charge the board with the amount of money, rental,
interest and principal, separately received from the sale of lease of lands, as
shown by the duplicate receipts of the state treasurer; and upon presentation
of the state treasurer's duplicate receipt shall credit the board with the
amount of the same.
History: L. 1899, ch. 64, § 37; C.L. 1907,
§ 2359; C.L. 1917, § 5611; L. 1921, ch. 118,
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933, & C. 1943,
86-1-54.

Cross-References. — Functions and duties
of state auditor, § 67-3-1.
General duties of state treasurer, § 67-4-1.

65-1-70. Exchange of lands between division and proprietors — Existing leases.
In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land holdings of the state, the
Division of State Lands is hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held
by the state for other land of equal value within the state held by other
proprietors; and upon request of the division, the governor is hereby authorized to execute and deliver the necessary patents to such other proprietors
178
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and receive therefrom proper deeds of the lands so exchanged; provided, that
no exchange shall be made by the division until a patent for the land so
received in exchange shall have been issued to such proprietors of [or] their
grantors.
Where the state lands are encumbered by an existing lease, the division,
upon approval of an exchange, may with the consent of the lessee terminate
the existing lease and issue a lease of the same type, without regard to provisions of § 65-1-45, on lands of comparable acreage or value which may be
acquired in the same exchange in which the leased lands are used as base.
Upon acceptance of exchanged lands, the state shall honor all vested rights.
History: L. 1899, ch. 64, § 43; C.L. 1907,
§ 2365; C.L. 1917, § 5618; L. 1921, ch. 118,
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
86-1-58; L. 1973, ch. 180, § 1; 1983, ch. 324,
§ 5.

Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment added the last sentence of the second
paragraph.
Cross-References. — Patents, § 65-1-43.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 73B C.J.S. Public Lands § 178.
Key Numbers. — Public Lands «= 181.

65-1-71. Board members and employees — May not acquire state lands.
The members of the State Land Board and its employees are hereby prohibited from acquiring, either directly or indirectly, any state lands or interest
therein; provided, that the provisions hereof shall not interfere with any application or any contract to purchase any state lands or with any renewal of
any lease made prior to March 6, 1925.
History: L. 1907, ch. 164, § 2; C.L. 1907,
§ 2369x3; C.L. 1917, § 5624; L. 1921, ch. 118,
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
86-1-59.
Compiler's Notes. — The powers and duties
of the State Land Board, referred to in this

section, were transferred to the Board of State
Lands. See § 66-1-1.
Cross-References. — Ethics Act, conflict of
interests prohibited, § 67-16-9.
Official misconduct an offense, § 76-8-201,
76-8-202.

65-1-72. Interference with application to acquire state
lands.
Any member of the board, or any employee thereof, who, either directly or
indirectly, in his own interest, or in the interest of another, interferes with or
hinders the application of a bona fide applicant to acquire state lands or any
interest therein is guilty of a misdemeanor.
History: L. 1907, ch. 164, § 3; C.L. 1907,
§ 2369x4; C.L. 1917, § 5625; L. 1921, ch. 118,
§ 1; 1925, ch. 31, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
86-1-60.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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Certificate
JNTY OF GARFIELD
iTE OF UTAH

I,

)
) SS
)

MAMIE D. HATCH

duly elected, qualified and acting County Recorder in and

Garfield County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of
PATENT
now of record in my office,

recorded (of filed)
Book 295

Page

29th

day of DECEMBER

19 87

587

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
order, at the city of Panguitch, Utah, this

12th

day of

FEBRUARY

GAkFIELD COUNTY RECORDER

19 88
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